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The Random Thought Thread

RavensMania

Staff Member
Administrator
Not sure who has the Washington Post, but I'll post the article here on the NFL's analytics movement

https://www.washingtonpost.com/spor...vement-has-finally-reached-sports-mainstream/

The NFL’s analytics movement has finally reached the sport’s mainstream

By
Sam Fortier
Jan. 16, 2020 at 2:50 p.m. EST
Joe Banner wasn’t expecting the phone call, but it didn’t surprise him. The former NFL executive sensed the current NFL head coach on the other end of the line, an old-school guy, needed a confidant outside his organization. The coach had spent his life around the game, knew it as well as anyone, but now it was being transformed by numbers he didn’t understand. So, the coach asked, what should he know about analytics?

Banner, an advocate and early adopter of advanced football statistics, understood why coaches feared them. It felt like a threat to their decision-making power. But he explained to the coach that they were basically advanced versions of the “tendency reports” he had been receiving from assistant coaches, who would scout opponents to determine how they approached every game situation, for years.

“Analytics are sophisticated, accurate and quality information,” Banner said. “There should be no coach afraid of that.”

The phone conversation, in a small way, symbolizes a broader shift in the NFL over the last decade. The sort of advanced statistics responsible for reshaping baseball and basketball have finally reached the football mainstream. The idea of data in the NFL is not new — Banner established the league’s first known analytics department with the Philadelphia Eagles in the mid-1990s — but the way teams are using it is. Information once primarily used by front offices has trickled down to coaching staffs, and they’re weaponizing it play by play.

Matt Manocherian, a former NFL scout and current vice president of football and research at Sports Info Solutions, compared the league’s implementation of analytics to a cartoon character running.

“You have the numbers, your legs are accelerating in the air,” he said, “but you don’t actually start moving fast until a couple seconds later.”



What to know about the NFL’s conference championship games

That’s how this year became a watershed season for the NFL’s analytics movement. It’s not just that the Baltimore Ravens and San Francisco 49ers, known for having two of the league’s more advanced analytics operations, secured the top playoff seeds in their respective conferences or that teams leaned into strategies such as going for it more often on fourth down.

It also included some of the NFL’s most ardent traditionalists, who either resisted or outright mocked analytics, starting to embrace them. This offseason alone, New York Giants General Manager Dave Gettleman, who once pantomimed an analytics person typing on a keyboard, said he hired “computer folks” to modernize his scouting department. New Dallas Cowboys coach Mike McCarthy, considered to have become outdated in his final seasons with the Green Bay Packers, spent his season off creating a plan for an entire football technology department.

The Cleveland Browns’ new head coach, Kevin Stefanski, summed up the current NFL ethos this week: “Information is power.”

It’s difficult for even industry insiders to determine the true origins of this breakthrough season because the NFL treats competitive advantages like state secrets. But it has been building for at least 20 years, since Banner started the Eagles’ analytics department and contracted MIT students for studies. They questioned basic tenets of the game, such as what makes a team good at drafting players? (Seemingly nothing — it’s a 50-50 proposition no matter the quantity or quality of scouts and the relative position of draft picks.) Or why prioritize running when passing yields more yards per play? (No good reason, particularly on first down.)

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This jump reflected a subset of fans dissatisfied with the sport’s standard statistics. Neil Hornsby, a football fan from England, decided to delve deeper and founded Pro Football Focus, one of the first advanced football statistics companies. PFF now has contracts to provide data for every NFL team, and its game-charting includes major college football in addition to the pros.



The universe of NFL data expanded gradually in the public eye with sites such as Football Outsiders and Stats LLC. Franchises savvy enough to seek out proprietary information gained an edge, such as when the New Orleans Saints piloted a player-tracking platform during their run to the Super Bowl after the 2009 season. Yet most progress was slow to catch on.

Patrick Mahomes won last year’s NFL MVP award, then hatched a plan to get better

Data providers discovered how difficult it was to convince some teams that what they had was useful. The inventor of the Saints’ system, John Pollard, later presented his process to “a number” of curious teams, and he found some were not even aware of the information already available. This all spoke to what Banner learned when he first started with the Eagles.

“Football is very, very much driven by conventional wisdom,” Banner said. “Most industries are this way. But in football, it’s true to an extreme degree.”

The moment that inspired many more teams to implement analytics into their on-field decisions, experts said, was the Super Bowl after the 2017 season. The Eagles captured their first title in part because they were aggressive on fourth down. Other teams realized they might be left behind if they didn’t act, so they flocked to PFF, Zebra Technologies (which collects game-day data) and other analytics companies. Services such as Sports Info Solutions developed holistic metrics aimed at quantifying a player’s production into one number, like baseball’s wins above replacement metric.

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The NFL itself devised a service called Next-Gen Stats, and during the 2018 season it started providing every franchise with advanced, leaguewide data. The numbers were no longer just cosmetic, such as a player’s speed. They could be leveraged in games, providing information such as how to tire an opposing defensive tackle with play-calling, how tight a window a quarterback was comfortable throwing into or which receiver gained the most separation on which routes in which situations.



“Teams get the raw, individual, player-level tracking data for every player on and off the field,” said Michael Lopez, director of data and analytics for the NFL. “Their speed, acceleration, direction and orientation are all captured. That is much more refined than anything that is available to the public. A lot of these things are what scouts and front-office personnel have always looked at, but now you are able to answer questions with data rather than just watching film.”

The smartest teams, Pollard said, use data in concert with traditional scouting, formulating a theory with one source and vetting it with the other.

“It’s a hand-and-glove relationship,” said Pollard, now vice president of Zebra Technologies. “Film is always a part of it. … But to ignore the power of the information and data available would be for time to pass you by.”

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The Packers, led by quarterback Aaron Rodgers, have been aggressive on second and short this season. (Gregory Shamus/Getty Images)
If last season was a test run, this year was the in-game data revolution at full speed. Teams tried more fourth-down conversions than ever (595). The Ravens attempted two-point conversions after every touchdown against the Kansas City Chiefs to maximize their potential points against an offense led by reigning MVP quarterback Patrick Mahomes.



The Green Bay Packers flipped a traditionally conservative situation, second and short, by passing 42 percent of the time — and gained more yards on average as a result. According to Derek Horstmeyer, associate professor at George Mason University’s School of Business, this is an area in which teams have been far too cautious, giving away the opportunity to gain a chunk of yardage downfield, knowing they have one more chance to move the chains if they fail.

“They played the most risk-averse football they could,” Horstmeyer said. “Not only do NFL coaches run it more often than they should, they are incredibly boring in their choice of run. They run it up the middle more than any other play out there.”

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In some cases, coaches, once the vanguard of tradition, seemed to slingshot ahead of the average fan. The shift was most evident in Week 11, when the Detroit Lions trailed the Dallas Cowboys by 14 points, scored a touchdown and tried a two-point conversion. That had happened twice between 2000 and 2017 — one of which was in a snowstorm — but this was the fifth instance in the past two seasons alone. Fans howled. The Lions failed. Yet it was a decision analytics supported because it offered a slightly higher win probability (converting the two-point play gives a team the chance to then take the lead with a touchdown and extra point if it scores again, while failure still gives the team the chance to tie with a subsequent touchdown and two-point conversion). It also telegraphed an important point.



Football’s conservative core can be attributed to its ability to magnify small situations. There are 16 regular season games, each crucial, and any mistake can blow up. This makes coaches risk-averse, Banner said, because they are the face of each decision. That they are now increasingly trusting analytics over gut instinct or past conventional wisdom shows the true cultural shift. It also is representative of the infrastructure in place to support those decisions, most notably through in-house analytic staffs.

The vital lesson of analytics is not to obey the numbers no matter what, experts said. No one decision can guarantee a win, and the key is a balance between what the data says and how a coach feels.

“There’s a misnomer out there that the more people teams employ, the better the team is in terms of utilization,” Banner said. “That’s not necessarily true. It’s synergy, communication and collaboration.”

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Ravens quarterback Lamar Jackson is tackled during the second half of Baltimore's divisional-round loss to the Titans. (Gail Burton/AP)
A season of analytics breakthroughs was not immune, however, to a postseason of analytics critics. After months of bringing these numbers into the mainstream, of forcing those who mocked or ignored them to reckon with them, the Ravens, who finished 14-2 in the regular season, lost their first playoff game. The Titans ended their season by using the type of run-heavy offensive attack that has been devalued by analytics and making a pair of fourth-down stops. Baltimore’s decisions to go for it twice on fourth and one were supported by win probability rates, and the Ravens — who were 8 for 8 on fourth and one during the season — had reason to feel confident.



Yet several skeptics took to Twitter to cite the Ravens’ loss as an example of the problem with trusting analytics too heavily, particularly in a single-elimination game.

“One game doesn’t set [the movement] back,” Manocherian said of the Ravens’ loss. He said that reaction indicated a fundamental misunderstanding of analytics, which involve probabilities, not certainties. “This just happens sometimes,” he added.

The situation reminded Banner of watching the Minnesota Vikings throw an end zone fade pass to tight end Kyle Rudolph in the first round of the playoffs. It was overtime against the New Orleans Saints, and the Vikings’ season rested on one of the sport’s lowest-percentage passes. Banner has spent his whole career fighting plays such as this, but in the moment he didn’t think it was a bad call. He respected that the coach had trusted his gut. He watched as Rudolph plucked the ball out of the air to deliver a Minnesota victory.

“Lower percentage does not mean unsuccessful,” Banner said.

Graphics and additional reporting by Neil Greenberg.

What you need to know about Super Bowl LIV
Updated January 24, 2020
The matchup for Super Bowl LIV is set: The San Francisco 49ers will face the Kansas City Chiefs on Feb. 2 in Miami Gardens, Fla. Here’s everything you need to know.

Meet the Chiefs: Kansas City’s offense is a juggernaut with star quarterback Patrick Mahomes under center; Tyreek Hill, Travis Kelce and Sammy Watkins catching passes; and Andy Reid, one of the greatest coaches never to win a Super Bowl, calling plays.

Meet the 49ers: San Francisco is the NFL’s biggest bully. The defense, led by Nick Bosa, is bruising. On offense, the constellation of quarterback Jimmy Garoppolo, tight end George Kittle and breakout star Raheem Mostert is difficult to contain. They’re also coached by Kyle Shanahan, the young mind behind the 49ers’ old-school approach.

Go a little deeper...

The NFL’s analytics movement has finally reached the sport’s mainstream

Len Dawson smoked his way through the first Super Bowl. The photos are priceless.

Andy Reid is the NFL’s most influential head coach

For Chiefs owner Clark Hunt and his family, this Super Bowl trip was 50 years in the making

What else to know: Best Super Bowl prop bets | How does the NFL’s pass interference rule work? | How do overtime rules work in the Super Bowl?
 
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Willbacker

Ravens Ring of Honor
Thanks.

That clip enhances my concerns about the over use of analytics. There are many variables that cannot be accounted for. For example; defensive alignment, play selection, momentum, negative impact if you don’t make the first down, etc. They discussed the second 4th down attempt in detail, which I was actually in favor of. The first one was the one I had issues with. We were down by 7, inside our own 50 yard line, and there was still over3 quarters left in the game. So what were the probabilities of our defense keeping them from scoring 3 or 7 points, vs. Giving Tenn a short field and them scoring at least 3 points, and giving them momentum?

IMO analytics are a tool in the tool chest but I don’t believe that they should be used as the end all decision maker on every situation. There are just too many variables that cannot be accounted for. Especially in a playoff game where it’s win or go home.

Really we should keep any 4th and 1's inside the opponents 40. Sure the analytics are going to give you a high probailty of making it but we was already like 9 for 9 in those situations and %'s are gonna catch up. If analytics show no emotions then you cant 100% lean on it. What are the %'s of 4th and an inch on your own 13? Could be 96% probability rating of making it. Punt the damn ball!! I agree the first one horrible. 3 qtrs. left and already looking desperate. Got the best damn punter in the game and if 3 and out you gonna regain your field position. To me it can show lack of confidence in your D and who knows a blocked punt or a shank. The 2nd I was ok with cuz you giving them bad field position but a FG could keep them within a 1 score lead if they kick a FG in return. Playoffs are just a different animal than reg season with emotions and adrenalyne pumped up at an extra level.
 

JoeyFlex5

Hall of Famer
The fucking mamba is gone... I am the farthest thing from a basketball fan but man I could appreciate seeing Kobe take over games the way he did. That man was a KILLER on the court. So sad.
 

rossihunter2

Staff Member
Moderator
Really we should keep any 4th and 1's inside the opponents 40. Sure the analytics are going to give you a high probailty of making it but we was already like 9 for 9 in those situations and %'s are gonna catch up. If analytics show no emotions then you cant 100% lean on it. What are the %'s of 4th and an inch on your own 13? Could be 96% probability rating of making it. Punt the damn ball!! I agree the first one horrible. 3 qtrs. left and already looking desperate. Got the best damn punter in the game and if 3 and out you gonna regain your field position. To me it can show lack of confidence in your D and who knows a blocked punt or a shank. The 2nd I was ok with cuz you giving them bad field position but a FG could keep them within a 1 score lead if they kick a FG in return. Playoffs are just a different animal than reg season with emotions and adrenalyne pumped up at an extra level.

You’re fundamentally misunderstanding how probability works here and how the analytics work too
 

Willbacker

Ravens Ring of Honor
You’re fundamentally misunderstanding how probability works here and how the analytics work too

Well that's a pretty wide ranging statement. We were 0 for 2 on 4th and 1's that I know. I cant just put the blame on the players. They don't make the calls. A player all the time is gonna want to go for it but the bottomline is that Harbaugh is the general ( the ultimate decisionmaker ).

2 statements from RM's post

The vital lesson of analytics is not to obey the numbers no matter what, experts said. No one decision can guarantee a win, and the key is a balance between what the data says and how a coach feels.

That they are now increasingly trusting analytics over gut instinct or past conventional wisdom shows the true cultural shift.

Stats are vital but they're not the end all be all.
 
So a few points I’ll respond with:

  • At the moment that is how analytics are being used - as a supplementary tool for harbs to use live - the numbers get given to him and he makes a decision based on game-feel, whether he thinks we’ll make it, and what those numbers tell him
  • The analytics do account for the change in win probability if you don’t make it - the risk factor is taken into account in the 2 numbers that Harbs gets given in those situations
  • So of your complaints most of them are accounted for either by the analytics themselves or by harbs at the time
  • The only thing it can’t account for is momentum - but that’s something that can only really be taken into account in hindsight because you never know whether momentum will actually change in a given situation and it’s not quantifiable either - it’s a pretty nebulous concept
  • But to criticise analytics as if it’s the be-all-end-all is to misunderstand how they’re being used right now

It would appear to me that Harbaugh went entirely with the analytics on the first 4th down try. They must have been convincing enough to him to ignore other factors such as:

- Was the risk of giving them a short field, more points and momentum worth the reward of making a first down?
- Did he really not trust his punter or defense? Koch is one of the best in the game and our D stopped them on their first drive.
- Most of his starters hadn’t taken a snap in 3 weeks. Why not let them get settled into the game before taking unnecessary risks?
- Two star players (Ingram & Andrews) were both playing at less than 100%.
- why risk putting extra pressure on your young QB who was obviously a ball of nerves early in the game.

I’m not against analytics. I think they are a great tool and they are here (NFL) to stay. I just hope coaches don’t become robots with numbers and discard the human element that has to be considered with every different situation.
 

rossihunter2

Staff Member
Moderator
It would appear to me that Harbaugh went entirely with the analytics on the first 4th down try. They must have been convincing enough to him to ignore other factors such as:

- Was the risk of giving them a short field, more points and momentum worth the reward of making a first down?
- Did he really not trust his punter or defense? Koch is one of the best in the game and our D stopped them on their first drive.
- Most of his starters hadn’t taken a snap in 3 weeks. Why not let them get settled into the game before taking unnecessary risks?
- Two star players (Ingram & Andrews) were both playing at less than 100%.
- why risk putting extra pressure on your young QB who was obviously a ball of nerves early in the game.

I’m not against analytics. I think they are a great tool and they are here (NFL) to stay. I just hope coaches don’t become robots with numbers and discard the human element that has to be considered with every different situation.

except we've been going for it in that sort of field position all year - it's not about not trusting koch or the defence, it's about him trusting the number 1 offence in the league to get a yard (which they'd done without fail all year) on the drive after they marched down the field only to be stopped by an unlucky int...

to me and a lot of people it was an obvious call to go for it there even given the game situation

and who here is actually suggesting you take the human element out of the way you call the game etc.? in every single write-up about how analytics are used the proviso that any coach's feel about the game is ultimately what will make a call happen or not
 
except we've been going for it in that sort of field position all year - it's not about not trusting koch or the defence, it's about him trusting the number 1 offence in the league to get a yard (which they'd done without fail all year) on the drive after they marched down the field only to be stopped by an unlucky int...

to me and a lot of people it was an obvious call to go for it there even given the game situation

and who here is actually suggesting you take the human element out of the way you call the game etc.? in every single write-up about how analytics are used the proviso that any coach's feel about the game is ultimately what will make a call happen or not

We’ll just disagree on this one. IMO analytics got in the way of better judgement (human element) and “the numbers” failed Harbaugh on that one. I could never agree that was the right call in that situation, based on the things I listed above. No matter what the numbers say.
 

cdp

Ravens Ring of Honor
We’ll just disagree on this one. IMO analytics got in the way of better judgement (human element) and “the numbers” failed Harbaugh on that one. I could never agree that was the right call in that situation, based on the things I listed above. No matter what the numbers say.
The numbers didn't fail Harbaugh on that one. I'm sorry, but your statement is just wrong.

When Harbaugh faces a decision “to go for it” on 4th down he communicates with Daniel Stern who provides different numbers (win probabilities and risk-reward ratios). These probabilities contain some of your listed quantifiable inputs. In most cases it makes sense to go for it than kicking a FG or punting. Harbaugh would't have gone for it if the probabilities hadn't been in our favor.

Unfortunately broadcasters and the media use the term “momentum” inflationary. Momentum is not quantifiable because it is not statistically significant. However I still think momentum exists, I’m sure all of us who played football, basketball, soccer etc. felt it. But it doesn’t matter as much as other stuff we know matter in a game of football.

As I mentioned a couple of posts ago, Harbaugh’s decision was right, but we didn’t get the outcome we’d have liked. A bad outcome doesn’t make this decision bad. You basically make the decision when you know the probabilities are in your favor. Let’s make a simple example: you pay $5 to enter a wager. You get $10 if you roll a 1,2,3,4 or 5, but you get nothing if you roll a 6. The odds are clearly in your favor (83.3%) and your expected payout is $3.33 if you repeat this game infinitely.
In our case we rolled a 6 (i.e. didn’t convert 4th down). So was it a bad decision? No, it was the right decision we just had a bad outcome. If we face the exact same situation again we will take this wager again and probably win (convert it)
 
The numbers didn't fail Harbaugh on that one. I'm sorry, but your statement is just wrong.

When Harbaugh faces a decision “to go for it” on 4th down he communicates with Daniel Stern who provides different numbers (win probabilities and risk-reward ratios). These probabilities contain some of your listed quantifiable inputs. In most cases it makes sense to go for it than kicking a FG or punting. Harbaugh would't have gone for it if the probabilities hadn't been in our favor.

Unfortunately broadcasters and the media use the term “momentum” inflationary. Momentum is not quantifiable because it is not statistically significant. However I still think momentum exists, I’m sure all of us who played football, basketball, soccer etc. felt it. But it doesn’t matter as much as other stuff we know matter in a game of football.

As I mentioned a couple of posts ago, Harbaugh’s decision was right, but we didn’t get the outcome we’d have liked. A bad outcome doesn’t make this decision bad. You basically make the decision when you know the probabilities are in your favor. Let’s make a simple example: you pay $5 to enter a wager. You get $10 if you roll a 1,2,3,4 or 5, but you get nothing if you roll a 6. The odds are clearly in your favor (83.3%) and your expected payout is $3.33 if you repeat this game infinitely.
In our case we rolled a 6 (i.e. didn’t convert 4th down). So was it a bad decision? No, it was the right decision we just had a bad outcome. If we face the exact same situation again we will take this wager again and probably win (convert it)

No I’m not wrong. It’s my opinion and I stand by it. Lol

So it’s your opinion that he should never make decisions that don’t agree with the analytics? That a playoff game doesn’t have a different weighted value then a regular season game? And it’s not just momentum and quantifiable inputs that I’m talking about here. Do you think the numbers account for most of our starters not playing in 3 weeks? Including a young QB who is playing the most important game of his career? And seemed to be nervous early in that game? Do they consider the possibilities of putting extra pressure on Lamar to play catch-up football? Do they consider what defensive alignment you might see on a given 4th down conversion attempt? There are so many real time variables that cannot possibly be included in the statistics, because stats are always based in history. As a football game unfolds there has to be human intervention in ALL decisions that are made because it is a very dynamic environment, and my point is that on that first 4th down try Harbs maybe could have made a more conservative decision that didn’t agree with the analytics. No guarantee that would have worked out for the better, I’m just saying.
 

SepticeyePoe

Hall of Famer
The numbers didn't fail Harbaugh on that one. I'm sorry, but your statement is just wrong.

When Harbaugh faces a decision “to go for it” on 4th down he communicates with Daniel Stern who provides different numbers (win probabilities and risk-reward ratios). These probabilities contain some of your listed quantifiable inputs. In most cases it makes sense to go for it than kicking a FG or punting. Harbaugh would't have gone for it if the probabilities hadn't been in our favor.

Unfortunately broadcasters and the media use the term “momentum” inflationary. Momentum is not quantifiable because it is not statistically significant. However I still think momentum exists, I’m sure all of us who played football, basketball, soccer etc. felt it. But it doesn’t matter as much as other stuff we know matter in a game of football.

As I mentioned a couple of posts ago, Harbaugh’s decision was right, but we didn’t get the outcome we’d have liked. A bad outcome doesn’t make this decision bad. You basically make the decision when you know the probabilities are in your favor. Let’s make a simple example: you pay $5 to enter a wager. You get $10 if you roll a 1,2,3,4 or 5, but you get nothing if you roll a 6. The odds are clearly in your favor (83.3%) and your expected payout is $3.33 if you repeat this game infinitely.
In our case we rolled a 6 (i.e. didn’t convert 4th down). So was it a bad decision? No, it was the right decision we just had a bad outcome. If we face the exact same situation again we will take this wager again and probably win (convert it)
You never hear about it being a bad decision when it works. As soon as it doesn't, it was the wrong move.
 
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rossihunter2

Staff Member
Moderator
We’ll just disagree on this one. IMO analytics got in the way of better judgement (human element) and “the numbers” failed Harbaugh on that one. I could never agree that was the right call in that situation, based on the things I listed above. No matter what the numbers say.

except i would bet you that even with out the analytics numbers in his ear that harbs would have gone for that both times - he's an aggressive coach and that's worked for him his whole career

my question for you is this: if you would have kicked on both those 4th downs - in what situation would you personally ever go for a 4th down if you were calling it?
 

rossihunter2

Staff Member
Moderator
No I’m not wrong. It’s my opinion and I stand by it. Lol

So it’s your opinion that he should never make decisions that don’t agree with the analytics? That a playoff game doesn’t have a different weighted value then a regular season game? And it’s not just momentum and quantifiable inputs that I’m talking about here. Do you think the numbers account for most of our starters not playing in 3 weeks? Including a young QB who is playing the most important game of his career? And seemed to be nervous early in that game? Do they consider the possibilities of putting extra pressure on Lamar to play catch-up football? Do they consider what defensive alignment you might see on a given 4th down conversion attempt? There are so many real time variables that cannot possibly be included in the statistics, because stats are always based in history. As a football game unfolds there has to be human intervention in ALL decisions that are made because it is a very dynamic environment, and my point is that on that first 4th down try Harbs maybe could have made a more conservative decision that didn’t agree with the analytics. No guarantee that would have worked out for the better, I’m just saying.

the numbers quantify what they can quantify
harbs takes into account all those other factors that you're using as strawmen...

ultimately every decision comes down to how harbs feels about the decision given all the information he has at his disposal (play-call, all the nebulous mental stuff, analytics numbers, personnel, injuries etc.) the analytics dont take away the autonomy of the coach - to suggest it does is to fundamentally misunderstand the role that analytics plays in the playcalling

the way analytics are used is in concert with coach observations not to supercede it
 

Willbacker

Ravens Ring of Honor
The numbers didn't fail Harbaugh on that one. I'm sorry, but your statement is just wrong.

When Harbaugh faces a decision “to go for it” on 4th down he communicates with Daniel Stern who provides different numbers (win probabilities and risk-reward ratios). These probabilities contain some of your listed quantifiable inputs. In most cases it makes sense to go for it than kicking a FG or punting. Harbaugh would't have gone for it if the probabilities hadn't been in our favor.

Unfortunately broadcasters and the media use the term “momentum” inflationary. Momentum is not quantifiable because it is not statistically significant. However I still think momentum exists, I’m sure all of us who played football, basketball, soccer etc. felt it. But it doesn’t matter as much as other stuff we know matter in a game of football.

As I mentioned a couple of posts ago, Harbaugh’s decision was right, but we didn’t get the outcome we’d have liked. A bad outcome doesn’t make this decision bad. You basically make the decision when you know the probabilities are in your favor. Let’s make a simple example: you pay $5 to enter a wager. You get $10 if you roll a 1,2,3,4 or 5, but you get nothing if you roll a 6. The odds are clearly in your favor (83.3%) and your expected payout is $3.33 if you repeat this game infinitely.
In our case we rolled a 6 (i.e. didn’t convert 4th down). So was it a bad decision? No, it was the right decision we just had a bad outcome. If we face the exact same situation again we will take this wager again and probably win (convert it)

The numbers didn't fail Harbaugh? Do what?
 
the numbers quantify what they can quantify
harbs takes into account all those other factors that you're using as strawmen...

ultimately every decision comes down to how harbs feels about the decision given all the information he has at his disposal (play-call, all the nebulous mental stuff, analytics numbers, personnel, injuries etc.) the analytics dont take away the autonomy of the coach - to suggest it does is to fundamentally misunderstand the role that analytics plays in the playcalling

the way analytics are used is in concert with coach observations not to supercede it

I have never suggested (intentionally) that analytics takes away autonomy of the coach. In fact I’m arguing that it damn sure should not. Some have implied that he makes or should make all his decisions based on the numbers. I disagree with notion. I agree with you about everything else. I just think he made the wrong decision in that particular situation, regardless of what the numbers told him to do. On the second try I have agreed with going for that one.

That is my opinion and it’s not going to change. Lol
 
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